Steve Gilbert MP

STEPHEN GILBERT'S SPEECH AT THE CENTREFORUM CONFERENCE ON "NATO IN LIBYA: A TRIUMPH OF EUROPEAN MULTILATERALISM?"

NATO's Secretary General has said that operation "Unified Protector" was "one of the most successful in NATO history".

There's no doubt that NATO was able, once the United Nations Security Council mandate was secure, to quickly and effectively deploy a range of kinetic military capabilities: enforcing a no-fly zone, a sea blockade, and delivering precision strikes against ground assets that threatened civilians.

NATO integrated air and sea assets from a variety of participating nations including, very notably, some non-NATO countries - and NATO was able to sustain this complex and intensive operation for six-months and to do so without the loss of a single allied service person.

NATO was instrumental in preventing a massacre in Benghazi, protecting the people of Libya and providing the ground forces of the National Transitional Council with space to determine their own destiny.

The 8,000 men and women who were engaged in operation "Unified Protector" can be rightly proud of what they accomplished in standing up against tyranny.

And let's be clear about this: there is not a single other multi-national military alliance anywhere in the world that would have been able to do similar.

On the back of this success, many people have been quick to point to Libya as being the model of model interventions.

It had regional political support, there was a clear UN mandate, we had the capability to act in both a time limited and an arms-length way and a good chance of success. Some even see this as the beginning of a new era of interventions under the Responsibility to Protect. Much of this debate is for another time.

There was no massacre in Benghazi, Gaddafi went, no allied troops were lost - and it is too tempting to look back and say to ourselves: "job well done".

There is another side to this story too.

NATO is a military alliance of 27 nations.

14 did not contribute to the mission at all.

A further five only committed forces with a national caveat that they be used in non-lethal activities.

Eight NATO nations bore the brunt of effort for an alliance that spans two continents.

Over half of the combat burden fell on Britain and France.

A shocking number of European NATO members were not willing to deploy lethal force to support a UN mission to protect civilians in Europe's own backyard.

If those States are not prepared to deploy lethal force under these circumstances - in the model of model interventions - then when will they?

Of course, the most notable absences were Germany and Poland.

The UN needs to look to States who will support its mission and will act to uphold its decisions - Germany flinched from doing so at a crucial moment and this must damage that country's hope to play a more leading role in the UN.

And of course there's another irony here.

Over the six-months of the Libya operation, the Germans and Poles have been pushing for a new European Union Operational Command Centre.

Frankly, what's the point is of having yet another new building in Brussels if States refuse to deploy force even when the issues at stake are so clear cut?

Worse still, though, than the perhaps predictable division among the European allies: the United States ended the Libyan campaign with the biggest bill in dollar terms.

$1.1 billion US dollars is a very large bill for a party that at best you weren't sure you wanted to be at.

France and Britain's combined bill comes in just under $1 billion US.

There's no doubt that the cost of the US's Libya campaign will be used by those in America who wish to see an end to US involvement in NATO and a more introverted and isolationist American posture.

And, yet again, for the umpteenth time, the Libya campaign showed the European NATO allies reliance on key American assets.

The US only deployed aircraft in a kinetic way, supported by cruise missiles strikes, for the first few weeks the campaign.

But without the United States' unique strategic assets, in terms of air-to-air refuelling, electronic warfare, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, command and control facilities and satellite and intelligence assets, it's unlikely that the European NATO allies would have been able to execute the operation at all.

Of course, it would be wrong to say it was all Britain and France and the United States.

Denmark, Norway and Belgium deserve special mention as European States that were prepared to support NATOs implementation of the UNSC resolution with lethal force.

Denmark accounted for 17% of all NATO strikes and was responsible for most strikes in proportion to number of planes deployed.

And, of course, we must not forget the key role played by Italy.

Overall though, due to US recalcitrance, the Libya mission suffered from significantly reduced firepower - with less than a quarter of the planes used in Kosovo, flying less than a fifth of the sorties, and European ammunition stores running dangerously low.

European dependence on American muscle is now actively damaging our national and economic interest and the European interest too.

America has become a crutch for an increasingly enfeebled European State system - an excuse to allow defence budgets to shrink and structural inefficiencies to remain unaddressed.

We need to throw off this support if we want both Europe and NATO to remain relevant.

Our dependence will, soon enough, prevent our ability to act effectively in the future - even when we want to do so.

There's every chance that a new and more isolationist American President would be reluctant to mobilise that country's unique abilities to support European NATO members even when, like with Libya, it's European NATO States providing the brute force.

And American attention is turning elsewhere. As President Obama made clear last week - as the American century turns into the Asian century - the US will focus its strategic resources on security challenges in that sphere. We will increasingly be on our own.

Europe needs to respond.

We must not allow ourselves to be deaf to the calls from America for reform or blind to the changing world around us.

As I said at the outset, there is no other military alliance in the world that could have deployed itself in the same way that NATO did in Libya. But it wasn't simply a NATO operation.

For the first time the alliance in Libya went beyond NATO member States and included as, active fighting participants, several Arab nations.

This gives us some insight into the future. As power shifts in the world the West alone is not going to be enough.

The world is moving away from a period of fixed alliances, like those we have seen over the last fifty years, into a period of flexible alliances, much more like the nineteenth century.

If Libya is one example of this, the management of Operation Atalanta, the EU-led anti-piracy operation is another.

The west is working here with other naval task forces and countries, including those from the Gulf, India and China.

Of course, the Indians and Chinese are very bashful about being seen to be engaged in joint operations; but in effect they are edging towards this.

Increasingly if we want to get things done in the world we are going to have to reach beyond the Atlantic Club.

And if we want European NATO members to remain relevant, both to the challenges we will face in this new century, and the shifting patterns of power - we have to get more "bang" for the European defence "buck".

Europe has half a million more men and women under arms than America; but we lack the heavy airlift, logistical support, command and control and remote war fighting abilities to do anything much with them except post them outside Palaces and inside barracks.

Europe suffers from bloated defence architecture, duplicated resources, and unreformed and nationally based suppliers.

We are spending too little and, what's worse, what little we are spending we are spending badly.

We should be honest enough with ourselves to recognise that NATO is the only common defence game in town in Europe.

We remain a hundred years or more away from a European army and a new building with a new badge won't help us project influence.

We need to get on and address our failings.

Libya showed that, among some European NATO States, there is a political will to deploy force and that it stretches beyond simply Britain and France. But we need more than just political will.

Europe needs a wider vision.

There has to be some coming together on strategy, a common definition of threat and an understanding of the appropriate role in promoting security and preventing conflict.

As well as that clear strategic vision we need better procurement.

Paddy Ashdown has recently said that "Proper defence co-operation will not be driven by generals at the top, but by integrating defence industries at the bottom."

The point he is making is that if European nations can develop an interlocking strategic view as a prelude to common procurement, it will not only create genuine defence co-operation, but will allow us to make the huge savings necessary in these difficult economic times.

There is some cause for optimism.

Europe already has an active structure for Franco-German military co-operation, a long-standing UK-Dutch Amphibious Force, and a Nordic Grouping.

On top of that, the recent UK-France bilateral defence treaty has the potential to deliver real savings through joint procurement, research and development, maintenance, training, and shared military doctrine.

But it seems that some parts of London see the new Anglo-French co-operation as the end of wider continental co-operation.

Paris sees it as the beginning of a wider co-operation which grows organically.

Paris is right on this and London is wrong.

If this entente cordial is to be a wider success - it's vital that the Germans join too. Indeed for it to work they can't be left out.

The same is true of Denmark, the Netherlands and others.

Instead of creating European defence co-operation by order of Brussels, top-down with buildings and badges, it will emerge in an informal, organic and bottom-up way.

Multiple bilateralism is the right future for European NATO member States: co-operation between clusters of like-minded countries, based on practical steps and in national interests.

As our American friends say, it should be a "no brainer."

It will reduce duplication, plug capability gaps, and focus on military utility - both in the near neighbourhood and beyond.

It should mean we can face the current fiscal environment at the same time as strengthening the European pillar of NATO.

By doing so we will ensure both the continued involvement of the United States in European security and also our ability to conduct operations in our and Europe's interest in the future.